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Abstract: We proposed and experimentally demonstrated a secure key generation and distribution
system that is compatible with optical amplifiers and standard wavelength-division multiplexing
(WDM) transmission systems. The key is generated from the phase fluctuations induced by
environmental instabilities. The key generation system is tested in a 240 km bidirectional fiber-pair
link with multiple optical amplifiers. To demonstrate the compatibility with WDM systems, 38 WDM
channels are transmitted together with the key distribution channel. The secret key is protected
against eavesdropping and coherence detection attack by the wide-band property of the signal carrier
and the fast-changing rate of the phase fluctuations.
Keywords: fiber optics communications; optical security and encryption; phase fluctuations
1. Introduction
Cryptography and data encryption are the fundamental elements of network security [1].
The effectiveness of the data encryption relies on the scheme to generate and distribute the key
securely. If the key is attacked and exposed to an eavesdropper, the encrypted signal can be easily
decrypted. Traditional key generation schemes are based on software algorithms. For example,
the widely used Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem is based on the difficulty to factor the
product of two large prime numbers [2]. The security of the system relies on computational resources
available for the eavesdropper, while the increasing power of quantum computing raises a potential
challenge to the software-based key generation schemes [3–6].
The physical layer encryption and key generation scheme provides an alternative solution to the
network security [7–9]. One of the most widely studied physical layer key generation schemes is the
quantum key distribution (QKD) [10–12]. The security of a QKD system relies on the fact that without
knowing the eigenvalues of the quantum states, the eavesdropper cannot measure the signal, which is
the quantum state of a single photon. Compared with traditional software-based key distribution
methods, the physical layer key generation methods take advantages of the physical properties of
the transmission media. If these physical properties are not properly recorded in real time, the data
are lost permanently. The physical property for QKD is the quantum state of a single photon. If the
eavesdropper does not know the eigenvalues of the quantum states, the original signals are lost at
the time as the signals are being received by the eavesdropper. In this case, even the eavesdropper
has unlimited computational power; the physical properties of the transmission media are not fully
digitized for post-processing and signal recovery.
In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate a key generation and distribution system that is
compatible with both optical amplifiers for long-range transmission and standard wavelength-division
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multiplexing (WDM) systems. The keys are generated from the random fluctuations of phase in fiber
interferometers [13]. Environmental instabilities, including temperature changes and mechanical
vibrations, induce random refractive index changes in fiber interferometers, which are deployed at
each one of the communicating pair with long optical delays, and are then converted to random phase
signals at both ends to generate digital keys. As a physical layer key generation scheme, the proposed
system generates keys from phase randomness and if the analog phase signals are not recorded
properly, the keys are lost and cannot be recovered.
The key generation system is demonstrated in a 240 km long fiber link with three optical amplifiers,
and the key distribution channel cotransmits with 38 WDM communication channels. The proposed
system is compatible with WDM channels and can be implemented over the existing fiber-optic
networks based on three facts: (1) Standard optical fiber and fiber amplifiers are used to transmit
signals for the key generation system. The key generation channel shares the C-band optical amplifiers
with the other 38 WDM channels to compensate the attenuation from standard single mode fiber
(SSMD). (2) The key generation system uses the bandpass filter with the same power extinction ratio
as the standard WDM filters to download the key generation channel from the networks. (3) Since
the power level of the key generation channel is comparable to the power level of the other WDM
channels, photodetectors for standard WDM channels are directly used to receive signals of the key
generation channel, and the key generation channel is installed with low cost. The proposed system
can be implemented by plugging in a pair of key generators to the existing fiber networks for the two
users (Alice and Bob) that require synchronized keys.
The security of the proposed system is based on the random phase fluctuations, and such phase
fluctuations always exist in fiber interferometers. A pair of matched optical delay lengths is introduced
to the two users that share keys. The matched optical delay lengths are in km range and coherence
length of the broadband source is in mm range. If the eavesdropper tries to measure the phase
fluctuations, another optical delay length has to be applied. The additional optical delay length,
which is also in km range, introduces new phase fluctuations, so the eavesdropper cannot accurately
measure the keys.
2. Experimental Setup
Figure 1 shows the experimental setup of the key generation system, which consists of two
Mach–Zehnder (MZ) delayed interferometers. The synchronized key signals are the results of the
interference from interferometers at both ends. Both Alice and Bob send and receive signals with
phases affected by the local temperature changes and mechanical vibrations. Since the signals in
both directions go through the same path, the phase fluctuations and the interference results at the
MZI outputs are the same at both ends, making key sharing possible. Broadband sources are used
as the signal carriers to prevent the eavesdropper from measuring the phase directly with coherent
detection. In the experiment, both Alice and Bob use a filtered amplified spontaneous emission
(ASE) with bandwidth 150 GHz and center wavelength 1547.6 nm as the light source. Since the
broadband source has short coherence length, which is 2 mm, the optical delays placed in Alice’s
(L1) and Bob’s (L2) interferometers have to be matched within the 2 mm range to recover the phase
information for key generation [14]. The optical delays used in the proposed system are typically in
the range of tens of kilometers. Without knowing the delays in the interferometers, it is extremely
difficult for the eavesdropper to scan the optical delays and find the coherence length in mm resolution.
The delays (L1 and L2 in Figure 1) range from 20 m to 26 km in the experiment, which means the
eavesdropper has to find a 2 mm range in up to a 26 km range in order to find the matching condition.
More importantly, it should be noted that by building another fiber interferometer for eavesdropping,
new phase randomness is created in addition to the transmitted phase information, thus reducing the
accuracy of the eavesdropper’s measurement of the phase information.
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standard WDM filters. 
Figure 1. Experimental setup. (EDFA: erbium-doped fiber amplifier; WDM: wavelength-division
multiplexing; PM: phase modulator).
The selection of 150 GHz bandwidth is a balanced solution that considers both the security of
the system and the compatibility to WDM channels. The coherence length is inversely proportional
to the bandwidth. Using the entire C-band for key generation enables the coherence length to be
shorter than 2 mm, which creates a challenge for the eavesdropper to find the coherence length
and the matching condition. However, it does not allow the existence of the other WDM channels.
With 150 GHz bandwidth, the key generation channel can coexist with the other WDM channels in
C-band. The selection of 26 km delay length not only provides large key space that challenges the
eavesdropper to find the matching condition, but also generates fast-changing phase fluctuations that
smear out the spectrum signatures that indicate the delay length. The experimental results for the
spectrum signatures with different delay lengths are discussed in Section 3.2.
3. Results and Analysis
3.1. Key Generation without Phase Filter
We demonstrated the transmission of the key distribution channel with 38 WDM channels using
standard C-band transmission window. The key generation system is tested in both back-to-back
transmission and a 240 km link. The 240 km bidirectional fiber-pair link includes three 80 km standard
single mode fiber (SSMF) spans, each with erbium-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) to compensate the
average fiber loss of 17.5 dB. The 38 dummy WDM channels were emulated by carving another
ASE source using a flexible-band wavelength selective switch ( SS) at 100 GHz spacing (Figure 2).
The spectrum shows that the power spectral density (PDF) of the key distribution channel is comparable
to the PDF of the other WDM channels, so the key generation channel can be downloaded from the
network by using a bandpass filter with the same power extinction ratio as the standard WDM filters.
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Figure 2. Spectrum of the key generation channel and the dummy WDM channels.
When 26 km optical delays are applied by both Alice’s and Bob’s MZIs, the two interference results
by direct photo-detection match each other in back-to-back testing (Figure 3a,b). The phase randomness
is generated from the 26 km optical delays deployed by both Alice and Bob. The spectrum analysis
further proves the matched signal. Figure 3c is the spectrum of signal received by Alice, and shows
that the signal exhibits frequency content up to 2 kHz. Figure 3d is the differential spectrum between
the received signals, and is obtained by the Fourier transform of Alice’s signal minus Bob’s signal.
The comparison between Alice’s spectrum (Figure 3c) and the differential spectrum (Figure 3d) shows
that Alice’s spectrum is significantly larger than the differential spectrum up to 1 kHz, which further
proves that Alice’s signal matches with Bob’s signal up to 1 kHz.
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Figure 3 sho s that Alice’s signal atches ith Bob’s signal in the back-to-back trans ission.
After 240 k trans ission, the interference results fro Alice and Bob do not atch (Figure 4a,b).
This is because other than the rate of phase change induced by the environmental instability, the ti e
of flight for the signal to travel between Alice and Bob also needs to be considered. In the experiment,
the average time for the phase changes induced by the 26 km long MZI is in the order of 1 ms (Figure 3),
while it takes the signal 1.2 ms to travel 240 km in the fiber. Thus, the signals in the two opposite
directions will experience different phase changes. Figure 4 shows that the average phase changes
induced by both the 26 km long delay of the MZI and the 240 km fiber are much faster than the phase
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changes in the back-to-back transmission system (Figure 3). The spectrum of the received signal has
frequency contents above 10 kHz (Figure 4c). The comparison between spectrum received by one
receiver (Alice in Figure 4c) and the differential spectrum (Figure 4d) shows whether the received
signals are matched at different frequencies. Figure 3c, d shows that in a back-to-back link, the received
signals are matched from direct current (DC) to 1 kHz, and in a logarithmic scale, most of the signal
power lies within the range of DC to 1 kHz. In the 240 km link, Alice’s spectrum (Figure 4c) and
the differential spectrum (Figure 4d) have the same amplitude from DC to 20 kHz, which means the
received signal does not match in any frequency components.
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There are two possible solutions to match the signals and synchronize the key: (1) The phase
fluctuation speed can be reduced by using delay lengths less than 26 km, so the signals transmitted in
both of the directions experience the same change. (2) A low-pass filter can be applied to remove the
fast-changing components of the phase changes. Section 3.2 shows that the first solution undermines
the security of the system. If the phase fluctuation speed is reduced, an eavesdropper is able to measure
the delay length by the spectral pattern of the received signal. Section 3.3 demonstrates that with the
second solution, the system generates matched keys in a secure way.
3.2. Security against Man-In-The-Middle Attack
The speed of phase fluctuations can be reduced by reducing the optical delay lengths in MZIs, since
the changing speed of the phase is proportional to the optical delay length in the interferometer [15,16].
However, the slower phase changing speed poses a potential security weakness to the system.
Eavesdroppers can use coherent detection to measure the location of the spectral fringes within the
key signal spectrum. With the spectral fringes, it is possible to measure the optical delay lengths
applied by Alice and Bob [17–19]. The challenge for an eavesdropper is that enough frequency
resolution is required to observe the spectral fringes, and the frequency resolution is determined by
the length of temporal data collected by the eavesdropper. With longer optical delay in MZ, a higher
frequency resolution is required, and at the same time the fast phase changes will essentially smear out
measurement results.
To determine the appropriate delay length that can defend the spectral-fringe-based attack,
we emulate the eavesdropper (red arrow in Figure 1) and perform the attacks to the systems with
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different delay lengths. An ultra-stable fiber laser with 400 Hz linewidth is used as the local oscillator
(LO) for the coherent detection. The Fourier transforms of the coherently detected signals show that
when 20 m and 2.3 km delays are used (Figure 5a,b), the fringes in the spectrum can be clearly identified
to track the phase fluctuation information within the interferometer. As for the 26 km delay, the fringes
are smeared out by the fast-changing phase due to the long measurement time frame needed to achieve
the frequency resolution required (Figure 5c). The experimental results show that the delay length of
the fiber interferometer has to be longer than a few kilometers in order to protect against coherent
detection attack.
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3.3. Key Generation with Phase Filter
Since longer delay length is needed to protect the signal from eavesdropping, to match the
interference results and enable the key exchange between Alice and Bob, the only solution is to remove
the fast-changing component of the phase fluctuations so the slow-changing component of the phase
fluctuations can be used for key generation. However, the low-pass filter cannot be directly applied on
the interference results, which is the cosine term of the phase, because cosine is not a linear function for
Fourier transform. Figure 4c, d compares the Fourier transforms of Alice’s direct detected signal and
the differential spectrum between Alice’s and Bob’s. The results show that Alice’s spectrum has the
same order of magnitude as the differential spectrum from DC to 10 kHz, meaning that the interference
results do not match in either low- or high-frequency ranges.
In order to detect the actual interference phase results, we use a phase modulator that switches
between 0◦ and 90◦ at a rate of 100 kHz, which is more than 10 times faster than the phase changing
rate (Figure 6a,b). Since the phase modulator switches at least one order of magnitude faster than the
random phase signal, we assume that a neighboring 0◦ and 90◦ phase shift from the phase modulator is
applied on the same random phase. In this case, both sine and cosine of the random phase are measured
to obtain the random phase value. After digitization, a low-pass filter with 3 dB cutoff frequency at
50 Hz is applied to the measured phase signal digitally to remove the mismatched high-frequency
phase components. Figure 7a, b shows the matched results from the cosine functions of the two filtered
phase signals. The signals are transmitted in the 240 km bidirectional link. The self-correlation and
cross-correlation of Alice’s and Bob’s filtered signals are plotted in Figure 7c. The self-correlations
of Alice’s and Bob’s individual signals show the true temporal randomness of the generated key.
The cross-correlation between Alice’s and Bob’s signals shows the matching performance of the key
exchange with correlation peak of 0.8. The comparison between Alice’s spectrum (Figure 7d) and
the differential spectrum between Alice and Bob (Figure 7e) shows that the differential spectrum has
a much smaller amplitude than Alice’s spectrum. The differential spectrum further proves that with
the 50 Hz low-pass filter applied on the phase, Alice’s signal matches with Bob’s signal.
Sensors 2020, 20, 6296 7 of 10
Sensors 2020, 20, x FOR PEER REVIEW 7 of 10 
 
 
Figure 6. (a) and (b) are signals with phase modulator; (b) is the enlarged view of the red region in (a). 
 
Figure 7. (a) and (b) are the received signals from Alice and Bob with high-frequency phase fluctuations 
filtered; (c) shows the self-correlations and cross-correlation of the signals; (d) Alice’s spectrum; (e) 
differential spectrum between Alice and Bob has a much smaller amplitude than Alice’s spectrum. 
To extract binary keys from the analog signals and reduce key errors, a buffer region is set in 
between the high and low levels, and the sampled points within the buffer region are dropped. The 
analog signals used to extract keys are sine and cosine functions of the recovered and filtered phases, 
which range from −1 to 1. The boundary of the buffer region is −vo and vo (0 < vo < 1). If the analog 
signal is higher than the buffer region, a bit 1 is generated as the key. If the analog signal is lower 
than the buffer region, a bit 0 is generated as the key. The buffer region is optimized to minimize the 
dropped samples and key error rate (Table 1). Both sine and cosine functions of the measured phase are 
used to generate binary keys. The key generation achieves a rate of 90 bps and an error rate of 5 × 10−3, 
which can be corrected by hard decision FEC technique [20,21] and key reconciliation [22]. To ensure 
true randomness of the generated key, the 90 bps is further reduced to 20 bps based on the width of 
the correlation peak in Figure 7c. The width of correlation peak is 100 ms, which means two bits with 
intervals equal to or larger than 100 ms are not correlated. By using the cosine of the phase, a bit rate 
of 10 bps is obtained. Since sine and cosine functions are orthogonal, another 10 bps is obtained with 
the sine function. 
  
Figure 6. ( ,b) are signals with phase modulator; (b) is the enlarged view of the red region in (a).
e sors , ,    I   f  
 
 
i r  . ( )  ( ) r  si ls it  s  l t r; ( ) is t  l r  i  f t  r  r i  i  ( ). 
 
i r  . ( )  ( ) r  t  r i  si ls fr  li    it  i -fr  s  fl t ti s 
filt r ; ( ) s s t  s lf- rr l ti s  r ss- rr l ti  f t  si ls; ( ) li ’s s tr ; ( ) 
iff r ti l s tr  t  li    s   s ll r lit  t  li ’s s tr . 
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Figure 7. (a,b) are the received signals from Alice and Bob with high-frequency phase fluctuations
filtered; (c) shows the self-correlations and cross-correlation of the signals; (d) Alice’s spectrum;
(e) differential spectrum between Alice and Bob has a much smaller amplitude than Alice’s spectrum.
To extract binary keys from the analog signals and reduce key errors, a buffer region is set
in between the high and low levels, and the sampled points within the buffer region are dropped.
The analog signals used to extract keys are sine and cosine functions of the recovered and filtered
phases, which range from −1 to 1. The boundary of the buffer region is −vo and vo (0 < vo < 1). If the
analog signal is higher than the buffer region, a bit 1 is generated as the key. If the analog signal is
lower than the buffer region, a bit 0 is generated as the key. The buffer region is optimized to minimize
the dropped samples and key error rate (Table 1). Both sine and cosine functions of the measured
phase are used to generate binary keys. The key generation achieves a rate of 90 bps and an error rate
of 5 × 10−3, which can be corrected by hard decision FEC technique [20,21] and key reconciliation [22].
To ensure true randomness of the generated key, the 90 bps is further reduced to 20 bps based on the
width of the correlation peak in Figure 7c. The width of correlation peak is 100 ms, which means
two bits with intervals equal to or larger than 100 ms are not correlated. By using the cosine of the
phase, a bit rate of 10 bps is obtained. Since sine and cosine functions are orthogonal, another 10 bps is
obtained with the sine function.
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By using standard optical amplifiers in WDM networks, the transmission distance can go beyond
240 km. The maximum transmission distance depends on two factors: (1) Key rate: To remove the
unsynchronized phase signal, the 3 dB cutoff frequency of the low-pass phase filter for the 240 km
link is 50 Hz. With the transmission distance longer than 240 km, the cutoff frequency is inversely
proportional to the transmission distance. (2) Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR): The signal carrier of the
key generation channel is wide-band ASE noise. The SNR of the key distribution channel is different
from the SNR of a standard communication channel that uses a laser as the signal carrier [23]. For the
standard communication channel, the ASE noise only exists in the denominator of the SNR. For the
key distribution channel, the power spectral density of the ASE noise affects both the numerator and
denominator of the SNR, which means the key distribution channel has shorter maximum transmission
distance than the standard communication channel. The theorical model and experimental results of
the maximum transmission distance for a communication channel that uses ASE noise as the signal
carrier is analyzed in [23].
3.4. Analysis of Information Leakage
Section 3.2 has demonstrated that if the optical delay is longer than a few kilometers,
the eavesdropper is not able to measure the spectral fringes and thus cannot measure the optical
delay by coherence detection. This section shows that the system is protected from the information
leakage, and even if the eavesdropper knows the right optical delay length, he or she cannot measure
the phase information from Alice and Bob. The analysis in this section is based on the assumption
that the eavesdropper uses brute force attack to scan the 26 km fiber with high resolution and finds
the 2 mm coherence length. Under such assumption, the eavesdropper uses the same optical delay
as the authorized users to measure the phase information from Alice (ϕA) or Bob (ϕB). The 26 km
optical delay applied by the eavesdropper generates additional phase randomness (ϕE). Although the
eavesdropper can use a feedback system to control the phase randomness, the feedback system applies
to the sum of the phase change ϕA + ϕE, which means the eavesdropper can only measure ϕA + ϕE or
ϕB + ϕE and cannot accurately measure either ϕA or ϕB.
3.5. Description of the Protocol
In this section, the key distribution protocol is summarized step by step based on the experimental
setup and results. The protocol includes the following five steps: (1) Alice and Bob match optical
delays with preshared length. Based on the secure analysis in Section 3.2, the matched delay lengths
range from a few kilometers to less than 100 km. The accuracy of the matched delay lengths is within
2 mm, which is the coherence length of the light source. (2) The delay lengths generate random phase
differences between two light paths at the interferometers on both Alice’s (ϕA = ϕA1 − ϕA2) and Bob’s
(ϕB = ϕB1 − ϕB2) sides, where ϕ represents phase, A and B represent Alice and Bob, respectively,
and 1 and 2 represent two paths in the fiber interferometers. In both of the transmission directions,
from Alice to Bob and from Bob to Alice, the signal carriers experience the same phase change
(ϕA1 − ϕA2 +ϕB1 − ϕB2), which generates synchronized keys. (3) The phase changes ϕA1 − ϕA2 and
ϕB1 − ϕB2 are time-dependent, and have frequency components from DC to 10 kHz (Figure 4). It takes
1.2 ms for the signal carriers to transmit through the 240 km fiber link, and if either ϕA1 − ϕA2 or
ϕB1 − ϕB2 changes during the 1.2 ms, Alice and Bob receive mismatched signals. Therefore, low-pass
digital filters are used at both Alice’s and Bob’s sides to remove the fast-changing frequency components
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of the phase changes ϕA1 − ϕA2 and ϕB1 − ϕB2., and only the slow-changing frequency components
are used to generate the keys. (4) A phase modulator that switches between 0◦ and 90◦ is applied at the
receiver (Figure 1), so both sine and cosine of the phase changes are received, and the phase information
can be recovered. (5) Alice and Bob both generate binary digital keys based on the synchronized analog
signals. A buffer region is set in between the high and low levels. Sampled signals above and below
the buffer region generate digital keys of 1 and 0, and the sampled signals within the buffer region
are dropped.
4. Conclusions
We propose and experimentally demonstrate a key distribution system that is compatible with
optical amplifiers for long-distance communication and standard WDM systems. The keys are
generated and digitized from the random phase fluctuations caused by environmental instabilities
in fiber interferometers. A bidirectional transmission link with multiple EDFAs and 240 km length
of optical fiber is demonstrated. The signal carrier of the key distribution channel is wide-band ASE
noise from EDFA and shares C-band transmission spectrum with 38 neighboring WDM channels.
The wide-band ASE noise and the fast-changing phase protect the optical delay in the key distribution
system from being measured by an eavesdropper with coherent detection attack.
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